Military Leadership From Ancient Greece to Byzantium: The Art of Generalship by Shaun Tougher;Richard Evans;

Author:Shaun Tougher;Richard Evans;
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
ISBN: 9781474459976
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press

Conclusion

Hence, I find Procopius’ depiction of Gelimer to be less sympathetic than some.92 As in the Strategikon, successful generals in the Wars had to control their own and their men’s fear, be prepared for defeat and adapt to tyche’s entanglements. Gelimer fails on all fronts. He leaves his cities without walls, neglects to predict Belisarius’ southern approach, underestimates his opponents and twice deserts his men when they need him most. In sharp contrast to Belisarius, he never tests his luck when the tides of fortune turn against him; instead, as with Basiliscus in 468, he cravenly flees.

The topos of fear remains a driving force throughout. I believe that the prominence of fear in the structure of the Vandal War was a conscious decision on Procopius’ part, much more than mere garnish absorbed thoughtlessly from his classical models. The first half of the Vandal War is fundamentally a story about the value of rational fear and the dangers of overconfidence during the shifting fortunes of a military campaign. Procopius associates Gelimer’s incompetence as a leader with the Vandal king’s inability to, at first, experience rational fear when Belisarius’ army approaches his realm, and next when he does not manage the emotion during the heat of battle. I contend, therefore, that the Roman victory over the Vandals was not ‘due to dumb luck’, as supposed by Anthony Kaldellis,93 but determined in large part by Procopius’ belief in moral differences between Gelimer and Belisarius.94

With his portrait of Belisarius, Procopius illuminates an ideal of generalship that was difficult for others, Roman and non-Roman, to match. The remainder of Book 4, after Belisarius departs from North Africa, paints a far gloomier picture of the return to Roman rule. Indeed, his lurid invective, the Secret History, is even more fervid, with Procopius’ denunciations of Justinian’s conduct of the military campaigns and criticisms of Belisarius.95 It is tempting, but misleading, to conclude on the basis of this evidence that Procopius had turned against Belisarius or rejected the justice of the Romans’ reoccupation of the lost African territories. When reading the Wars, we should not rely primarily on the criticisms, while ignoring the praise. I concur with a scholar’s recent assessment that the Wars ‘is, in fact, much more open-ended than we may be willing to admit’.96 In my reading, Procopius laments the messy process behind the reintegration of Vandalic North Africa back into the empire, not the justice of the Roman cause. Moreover, since for Procopius virtue-based generalship contributes heavily to victories, it follows logically that a general’s moral shortcomings contribute to defeats. Certainly, we should not underestimate the role that generalship plays in Procopius’ vision of the Romans’ triumphs over first the Vandals and then the Moors. As with another writer associated with Justinian’s regime – the North African court rhetorician Corippus – for Procopius, virtuous generalship would play a significant role in returning Vandalic Africa to the Roman fold, while internal bickering, avarice, unmanly cowardice, intolerance and unjust behaviour by the Roman soldiery would lead to chaos and insurrection.

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